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he title chosen for this lecture is deliberately provocative 
and somewhat misleading. It is not meant to suggest 
that Islam, or Islamic law, has failed in some general or nor-
mative sense. Rather, the lecture will argue that the e≠ort 
by modern Sunni Muslim Reformers, and their Islamist fol-
lowers, to generate Islamic legal rulings has failed to achieve 
the political vision of a powerful and confident Islamic order. 
The Reformers’ political program has failed both because 
their interpretation of the law has proven inadequate to 
deliver on its promises and because the instrument through 
which they chose to impose this interpretation—the institu-
tion of the modern state—has proven inappropriate for the 
purpose. I hope to show here that this failure is due to the 
fact that the program of the modern Sunni Reformers rep-
resents a double rupture with the past: first, the Reformers 
deliberately chose to sweep away the teachings of the estab-
lished schools of law; second, they opted for the state rather 
than society as the means by which to impose their program. 
These two ruptures have proven to be a source of weakness 
rather than strength.
What do I mean by reform? As European military and 
cultural power grew dominant, and overpowered Muslim 
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Inspired by what they saw to be the central role of the state, 
with its uniform legal code, in European nation-building (viz. 
France’s Code Civil and Germany’s Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), 
the Reformers believed the state should be the principal vehi-
cle for imposing their vision of the law.
My lecture will focus primarily on scholars from the 
Reformer camp, such as Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–
1935) and Ahmad Muhammad Shakir (1892–1958), and 
their Muslim Brotherhood followers, Hasan al-Banna 
(1906–1949) and Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966). I will also 
present the views of their critics in the Traditionalist camp, 
including those of Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari (1879–
1951) and the contemporary Lebanese intellectual Ridwan 
al-Sayyid (b. 1949). But before turning to the Reformers, a 
few words are in order regarding the Westernizers and the 
Traditionalists. 
The Westernizers
The Westernizers are represented by men such as Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan (1817–1898) in British India and the Egyptians 
Rifa‘a al-Tahtawi (1801–1873) and Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–
1966). The latter authored one of the defining works of 
the movement, Islam and the Foundations of Governance, in 
which he attempted to separate religion from politics and 
for which he was severely penalized. The Westernizers’ proj-
ect emphasized, among other matters, Western education 
(including for women) and the codification of law through 
populations and territories across the globe in the nine-
teenthth century, many Muslim intellectuals reacted with 
ideas for reforming Islamic tradition and society. Their 
main purpose was to regain for Muslims the power and 
civilizational glory they once enjoyed. As such, their idea 
of reform cannot be dissociated from the desire for power 
in all its forms (intellectual, military, industrial, etc.). The 
Muslim reactions to European dominance broadly fell into 
three categories, involving three di≠erent groups of intel-
lectuals and scholars: the Westernizers, the Traditionalists, 
and the Reformers. The Westernizers argued that Muslims 
must learn from Europeans and adopt many of their ways, 
including their educational and legal systems. By contrast, 
the Traditionalists rejected European laws and values and 
clung tightly to their inherited theological and legal tradi-
tion, which they claimed lay at the core of Muslim identity. 
The Traditionalists were not Luddites, however, and they 
argued that a greater emphasis on education and industry 
was needed to gain strength. While they too were con-
cerned with the weakness of Muslim societies, they did not 
see restructuring the law as the avenue for redressing the 
situation. The third group consisted of the Reformers, who 
believed that the weakness was due to dynamics over many 
centuries within Muslim societies, especially in the realm of 
law, and that the legal system needed revamping to bring 
the community back to the authentic teachings of Islam. 
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regarded as an admission of Muslim defeat, and its propo-
nents were viewed as men intoxicated with the West (the 
so-called Westoxified, or Gharbzadegi in Persian) who had 
no independent identity. While the 1979 revolution in Iran, 
which ushered in the Islamic Republic and the ideology of 
Khomeinism, can be regarded as the most significant and 
politically successful response to the Westernizing project, 
the rise of Islamist politics throughout the Arab world from 
the 1970s onward is as much a response to the same tension.
The Traditionalists
The Traditionalists have been relatively more influential 
intellectually than the Westernizers, but they too can be seen 
as having failed to realize their vision of Islam, at least with 
regard to the Arab world. Here they have not had a significant 
political impact, and their followers remain small in number, 
unlike in Turkey and India where their followers appear to 
be more influential. 
The writings of the scholar Muhammad Zahid al-Kaw-
thari best capture the Traditionalists’ teachings. Kawthari 
was an aid to the last Shaykh al-Islam of the Ottoman Empire, 
a staunch defender of the Hanafi school of law, and a prolific 
writer and editor of manuscripts. He is regarded as one of 
the most learned scholars of his day. He was also a polemicist 
who engaged in vigorous and vituperative debate with the 
Reformist scholars who argued for abandoning the schools 
of law (madhahib). Kawthari’s project was to valorize the 
the adoption of European codes. They believed that the 
revival of Muslim peoples required an emphasis on universal 
ethical and philosophical values—values shared by Muslims 
and non-Muslims alike. This did not mean, however, that 
the Westernizers were particularly concerned with reform-
ing Islamic law per se. If anything, they wished to restrict its 
practical e≠ects to the greatest extent possible, limiting its 
reach only to areas such as ritual law. 
To date, the Westernizers have not produced a significant 
intellectual following in the Islamic world, and their ideas 
can largely be understood to have failed. This is in part due to 
the fact that the postcolonial governments in many Arab and 
Middle Eastern countries (e.g., Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Syria, 
Iraq, and Iran) adopted much of their project, albeit without 
its liberal political values, and later failed to deliver on the 
promise of empowerment and development. While the Arab 
defeat during the Six-Day War of 1967 crystallized this fail-
ure, there were many other discrete moments of impotence.
The central problem was that the military o∞cers who 
had usurped power in the post-WWII period claimed to 
uphold nationalist and secular values, but the ideologies 
they actually imposed on their citizens amounted to noth-
ing more than fascism. Their brutal authoritarianism and 
venality led the regimes to lose legitimacy and, with this, 
the Westernizing project to lose much of its attractive-
ness to mainstream society. Westernization became widely 
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other nations over the discovery of the universe’s secrets, the 
embedded power that God has placed in metals, plants, and liv-
ing creatures…1 
Kawthari warned that attacking the legal tradition, as the 
Reformers sought to do, would not only eviscerate twelve 
hundred years of diligent and earnest e≠ort by the best minds 
of Islam, but also lead to terrifying consequences: strife 
between Muslims and interpretive chaos. Reading about 
the violence that envelops so much of the Muslim world 
today, one cannot help but sense that Kawthari was o≠ering 
a prescient warning. What the Reformers wished to accom-
plish amounted to a self-inflicted form of disemboweling 
that would ultimately destroy the coherence of the Muslim 
community and obliterate its identity.
The Reformers
Who were the Reformers that Kawthari loathed so much 
and what was their project about? Amongst the most 
influential Sunni Reformers were the Syrian Muhammad 
Rashid Rida and the Egyptian Ahmad Muhammad Shakir. 
Their project can be described as an attempt to rid Muslim 
belief and practice of the evils of taqlid—the adherence to 
the rules of the established schools of law. They sought to 
1 Muhammad Zahid al-Kawthari, al-Ishfaq ‘ala ahkam al-talaq 
fi al-radd ‘ala “Nizam al-talaq” alladhi asdarahu al-ustadh Ahmad 
Shakir al-Qadi (Cairo: Matba‘at Majallat al-Islam, n.d.) (author’s 
translation).
richness of the traditional schools of law—especially his own, 
the Hanafi—and to argue that their preservation was central 
to Muslim identity, as well as social and political cohesion. In 
terms of politics, he saw the caliphate—the unitary Islamic 
state that was represented by the Ottoman state—as the ideal 
form of government. He objected to the idea that Islamic law 
needed revamping or that the state should be used instru-
mentally for achieving this end. The traditional scholars 
were the custodians of Islamic law; and the revitalization 
of Muslim society, however necessary, did not require legal 
reform. The government’s business was to look after the 
political interests of the community and to maintain order. 
Kawthari argued that if Muslim power was to be regained, 
reform or “renewal” of the law was the worst avenue to fol-
low. Here is how he forcefully made his case in a book on the 
reform of the law of marriage:
The reform of the law of marriage and divorce as well as all other 
Islamic laws is a very easy feat for the one who has no fear of God 
in his heart, is ignorant of the abilities of the founder Imams of 
the law schools and the proofs they used for their opinions, and 
is excessive in arrogance and egotism. This renewal [of the law 
that the Reformers desire] will not raise the Muslim community 
to the level of other advanced and wise nations, and it is not 
what will allow Muslims to produce planes, cars, fleets [of ships], 
submarines, commercial hubs and industrial firms. Rather the 
beneficial renewal that will raise Muslims is competition with 
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Rida sought to get through this scholastic jumble of opin-
ions and o≠er an alternative to what he saw as the fanatical 
attachment to the schools in order to empower Muslims. 
This sentiment toward the schools of law was, he argued, 
alien to Islam’s original message. More importantly, it pla-
ced a distance between the believer and God’s revelation. 
Furthermore, it weakened Muslims by dividing them into 
mutually exclusive groups at odds with one another. Here is 
how he expressed this:
In sum, it is attested in the apodictic texts of revelation and in 
the consensus of the community that it is a great sin for Muslims 
to be divided among schools of law and in their opinions, not to 
mention the fanaticism of each group for its particular school 
whether on matters of creed or law…the harmful and evil con-
sequences of such division (tafarruq) is mentioned in the history 
books and has led in these days to the weakening of the Muslims, 
the disappearance of their political rule and the domination of 
the foreigners over their territories.3
Furthermore, strict taqlid was, according to Rida, incon-
sistent with the spirit of the modern age, in which indepen-
dence of opinion and understanding prevailed among edu-
cated people who had little or no knowledge of the religious 
sciences. Given this, the insistence that God’s religion was to 
3 Muhammad Rashid Rida, introduction, al-Mughni, vol. 1 by 
Ibn Qudama (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1983), 16 (author’s 
translation).
replace taqlid with a form of independent reasoning that 
would allow Muslims once again to interface directly with 
the proof-texts of revelation, which are the verses of the 
Qur’an and the statements of the Prophet with probative 
legal content. The bulk of such material can be found in 
the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (hadith), and the 
practice of independently deriving legal rulings from such 
sources is referred to as ijtihad. The Reformers excoriated 
the fanaticism that the followers of the legal schools (mad-
hahib) developed over time for their particular rules and the 
scholars who had formulated them. The Reformers’ writings 
are filled with satirical anecdotes about the fanatical attach-
ment many had developed for the rulings of the schools, so 
much so that the underlying principles of the law had been 
forgotten and were now replaced by the superfluous and 
superficial aspects of the teachings and judgments. Rashid 
Rida, for example, mentions Hanafis hitting other Muslims 
during the prayer because they did not adhere punctiliously 
to their rituals. There is truth to the claim that the schools of 
law had become overly insular and, more importantly, that 
the individual believer and scholar had di∞culty ascertaining 
the basis for any given ruling among the confusing welter of 
opinions in the standard legal manuals and commentaries.2 
2 I have recently written about this in detail. See Bernard Haykel 
and Aron Zysow, “What Makes a Madhhab a Madhhab: Zaydi 
Debates on the Structure of Legal Authority,” Arabica 59 (2012): 
333–71.
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untidy quality of the inherited legal tradition unsatisfying, 
and certainly felt that this was not well suited for a society 
in the twentieth century. Instead, Rida desired greater uni-
formity and standardization. To achieve this, he felt it was 
important to cite probative texts from revelation, especially 
from the hadith corpus, when elaborating a legal opinion. 
Furthermore, Rida believed that the Shari‘a had an answer 
to all contingencies and that its textual sources were perspic-
uous. In other words, the Shari‘a was so comprehensive that 
its rulings could apply to all aspects of life.
The second development relates to Rida’s heavy reliance 
on juristic principles that were seen as weak and marginal in 
the premodern Islamic legal tradition because of their highly 
subjective and textually unfounded characteristics. In the 
absence of an appropriate proof-text, Rida would often 
resort to using the concepts of public welfare (maslaha) and 
the “purposes of the law” (maqasid al-shari‘a) to justify his 
conclusions. These principles allow the jurist to deem some-
thing permissible if it serves the welfare of the community 
or if it serves one of the purposes of the law, such as the 
preservation of life, religion, reason, lineage, and property. 
Among contemporary legal Reformers, this has become an 
important way not only to expand the scope of Islamic law 
but also to contravene long-held opinions of the schools. 
One example of this was when Rida deemed it permissi-
ble for Muslims to take out insurance policies, a practice 
be found exclusively in the rulings of the traditional schools 
of law had become a reason for rejecting Islam as well as a 
reason for apostasy and atheism. 
Rida was not original in making the case for reforming 
Islamic law, but the thrust of his project and the verve with 
which he pursued it had profound legal and political conse-
quences. To strengthen his message, Rida deliberately edited 
specific premodern manuscripts and revived particular teach-
ings that, while influential, had always represented a small 
minority of Muslim legal opinion in the past. The views and 
texts he highlighted were those of Ibn Hazm (994–1064), the 
strict-constructionist Zahiri scholar, and those of Salafis like 
Ibn Qudama (1147–1223), Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), and 
Muhammad al-Shawkani (1760–1834). He repurposed the 
ideas of these premodern scholars for his reformist project.
Two important, and perhaps unintended, developments 
resulted from Rida’s e≠orts. First, he initiated a process for 
rejecting the epistemology of traditional legal rulings, most 
of which had been built by analogical reasoning (qiyas). The 
bulk of the premodern Islamic legal tradition is based on 
analogical arguments that are rooted in probabilistic rea-
soning, which allows for a multiplicity of opinions. Because 
of this, the products of juristic opinion have a contingent 
quality where one can find di≠ering but equally valid views 
on any given matter within any of the schools of law, let alone 
among them. Many moderns, like Rida, found this strikingly 
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My particular interest in Shakir lies in a series of long 
essays he wrote on the role of positive law (i.e., Western-
based law) and the importance of applying Islamic law. In 
these essays, he excoriated judges who applied Western law 
because he believed it had a pernicious e≠ect on Muslims 
by pulling them away from the faith and leading them to 
outright unbelief. He could not conceive of Muslims living 
in a non-Islamic legal environment. Instead, Shakir advo-
cated for a virtuous Islamic order where the state plays a 
central role in implementing Islamic law. In Shakir’s view, 
state institutions should be ordered by scholars that have 
formed a higher committee (lajna ‘ulya) and who engage in 
forms of collective ijtihad (independent judgment) to apply 
and develop rules of Islamic law for the people. 
Shakir idealized the Islamic past and painted a glowing 
picture of how Islamic law used to be applied. Unlike the 
Westernizers who reluctantly conceded a role for Islamic law 
only in personal status matters or rituals, Shakir sought to 
implement the full panoply of Islamic legal rulings. In par-
ticular, he saw the penal regulations of the Shari‘a as having 
many social benefits. As one example, Shakir points to how 
much safer the Hijaz in Arabia became after Saudi Wahhabis 
conquered it in 1925 and began to apply Islam’s penal regula-
tions. But like Rida, Shakir was hugely concerned about the 
political weakness of Muslims. He, more than any scholar I 
that would have been considered prohibited by the classical 
tradition because of its excessively speculative nature. The 
majority of the traditional scholars considered maslaha and 
maqasid to be appropriate bases for ruling only in extreme 
cases because of their subjective nature or, put di≠erently, 
their jurisprudentially unprincipled moorings. The classical 
jurists did not resort to these principles systematically or 
regularly, unlike the modern Reformers who are primarily 
concerned with using the law to bring Muslim society up to 
date with, what they consider to be, contemporary norms 
and practices.
The next person I would like to focus on is Ahmad Muh-
ammad Shakir, the prolific author, text editor, and judge 
from Egypt. He is perhaps best known for editing the Risala 
of Imam al-Shafi‘i, arguably the first and most important 
work in the field of Islamic jurisprudence. Shakir depicts 
himself as following in Rida’s intellectual lineage, but he 
clearly had much more developed views on the hadith sci-
ences, modes of applying law, and role of the state in imple-
menting Shari‘a. He remains hugely influential today among 
a variety of circles. He is especially popular with the Salafi-
jihadis, although he eschewed revolutionary violence. The 
Muslim Brotherhood also draws inspiration from his views, 
though it is less invested in the intellectual and scholarly 
project that Shakir championed.
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be repealed… and no law which may be in any way repugnant 
to the Shari‘a shall be enacted in future… That the State, in 
exercising its powers, shall not be competent to transgress the 
limits laid down by Islam.5 
Likewise, Hasan al-Banna, the Egyptian founder of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, saw Islamic law as central to the polit-
ical and social order he sought to bring about. He writes:
This body of law must be derived from the prescriptions of the 
Islamic Sacred Law, drawn from the Noble Qur’an, and in accor-
dance with the basic sources of Islamic jurisprudence. For the 
Islamic Sacred Law, and the decisions of the Islamic jurists are 
all-su∞cient, supply every need, and cover every contingency, 
and they produce the most excellent results and the most blessed 
fruits. If the punishments prescribed by God were carried out, 
they would be a deterrent dismaying even the hardened criminal, 
restraining even the habitual thug, and relieving governments 
of the annoyance of worthless experiments.6 
Ideologues like al-Banna invoke the inherited prestige 
of the Shari‘a to legitimize their political program, but at no 
point do they admit that it remains, as system of law for a 
modern state, an unfinished project. Much as the Reformers 
5 Sayyid Abul A‘la Maududi, The Islamic Law and Constitution, 
trans. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), 107.
6 Hasan al-Banna, Five Tracts of Hasan al-Banna, trans. Charles 
Wendell (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 89.
know, makes the argument that implementing Islamic law 
through the state while rejecting Western law is the panacea 
that will reverse his community’s political fate.4 
The argument about the centrality of the state in impos-
ing Islamic law has been taken up by many others, including 
the Indo-Pakistani Islamist intellectual Abu al-A‘la Maududi 
and the Egyptian ideologues of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Admittedly, these thinkers have done so in a less refined and 
more opportunistic fashion than Shakir, and with the aim 
of capturing power for themselves. So we see, for example, 
Maududi, in a chapter entitled “How to Introduce Islamic 
Law in Pakistan,” write the following:
 …it is the state which should play a positive role in the estab-
lishment of the Islamic system of life. When the state is our own 
and we have placed at its disposal all the resources of our coun-
try, there is no reason why we should go elsewhere to fetch the 
architects of the Islamic social order. …the first step towards our 
destination would be to Muslimise (convert to Islam) the state 
which is still based on and working according to the same secular 
bases on which it did during the British period…. That the basic 
law of the land is the Islamic Shari‘a… That all those existing 
laws which may be in conflict with the Shari‘a shall in due course 
4 See Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, al-Kitab wa-l-sunna yajib an 
yakuna masdar al-qawanin (Cairo: Maktabat al-Sunna, n.d.) and 
Ahmad Muhammad Shakir, Hukm al-jahiliyya (Cairo: Maktabat 
al-Sunna, n.d.).
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For the Reformers and their Islamist followers, applying 
Islamic law has become the central method of establishing 
the desired social and political order, and the state is seen as 
the only mechanism for enacting this change. The Shari‘a 
will provide all the answers, though how exactly is never fully 
explained. In this formulation, the Reformers and Islamists 
have engaged in a project that, on the one hand, overempha-
sizes the role law can play in reforming society, and, on the 
other, relies exclusively on an institution—the state—that 
has stood in uneasy tension for many centuries with Islamic 
law and its jurists.
Like all premodern states, the Islamic state of the past was 
nothing like the intrusive and all-controlling modern states 
of the present. Moreover, the Muslim jurists who were the 
producers and purveyors of Islamic law in the past typically 
had a close and symbiotic relationship with the masses and 
a subtly antagonistic relationship with the ruler. The jurists 
often saw the latter as a source of corruption that undermined 
Islamic principles and law, either because of Realpolitik or 
because of the ruler’s personal failings. Perhaps because of 
the threat posed by the West to Muslim societies or because 
they have been deeply influenced by the modern vision of 
the state and its role in society, modern Islamic scholars and 
ideologues have chosen to ignore these facts about the history 
of the state and its problematic relationship to the Shari‘a.
Men like Shakir, Qutb, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and even the 
have claimed that they are producing a system that is apt for 
running a modern state, theirs remains a rudimentary and 
far from complete endeavor. This can be seen, for example, 
from the writings of Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Qatar-based 
Muslim Brotherhood scholar who is in his 80s and appears 
regularly on Al-Jazeera television. Al-Qaradawi is one of 
the intellectual pillars of the Reformist project. He keeps 
promising to produce a jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh) that 
will undergird his legal rulings and supplant the traditional 
system, but it has yet to materialize. Instead, all al-Qarad-
awi has managed to accomplish is the creation of a global 
personality cult focused on him and bolstered by his many 
publications and media appearances. It is as if he is telling 
the Muslim public to trust him that such a reform of Islamic 
law is possible because he personally assures them that it 
is and that he will accomplish this eventually. By contrast, 
political activists like al-Banna or Maududi do not bother 
with such details, not least because it would unnecessarily 
complicate the vision and program they wish to impose. It 
remains for those following the Islamists to take them at 
their word, namely that, once in power, they will be able to 
run a political order on the basis of the Shari‘a.
Sayyid Qutb, the most famous of the ideologues of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, would also insist that the application 
of Islamic law is the sine qua non marker of legitimate Islamic 
rule and that the state’s principal role is to enforce this law. 
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Al-Sayyid’s views on Islamic law are rooted in a deep 
understanding of its pre-modern history. Here, as in Kaw-
thari’s vision, the state plays an important role in defend-
ing the Muslim realm and establishing order. For al-Sayyid, 
however, the formulation of the law should be the purview 
of private specialists: the jurists. It was they who preserved 
Islam and maintained its rich, varied, and tolerant legal heri-
tage—often in spite of and in opposition to the ruler. Without 
them and without rooting the interpretive enterprise in soci-
ety rather than the state, Islam would not have survived. In 
arrogating for the state the exclusive right to determine the 
law, the Reformers would be breaking with centuries of legal 
practice. For the more traditionally minded scholars, like 
Kawthari and al-Sayyid, there is a double irony in the idea 
that state monopolization of law is the means through which 
Muslims should regain their lost power. First, the modern 
state will strip Islamic law of all its diversity and richness and, 
in so doing, endanger the core of Muslim identity. Second, it 
will do so while fulfilling a role it was never meant to perform.
The picture presented in this lecture is a bleak one. 
The Westernizers, the Traditionalists, and the Reformers/
Islamists have all failed to produce a political and social 
order that gives Muslims a sense of place and pride in the 
world. The multiple failures have to do with many di≠erent 
“al-Dawla al-islamiyya al-haditha fi mu’tamar ‘Amman,” Al-Sharq 
Al-Awsat, 30 Aug. 2013.
Shi‘i Ayatollah Khomeini have a radically di≠erent vision of 
the state. For them, the state is the instrument for implement-
ing the law and revivifying the Muslim community from its 
powerless position in the world today. Very few are the voices 
of opposition to this state-centered vision. One of them is 
the Lebanese intellectual and scholar Ridwan al-Sayyid. 
Al-Sayyid sees a calamity befalling Muslim societies where 
Islamists have come to power after the uprisings of the Arab 
Spring. In his numerous writings, in books, articles, and 
op-eds, al-Sayyid argues that for centuries Islamic beliefs 
and practices were determined by the community ( jama‘a) 
and not by the state. The meaning of Islam was explicated 
by the societies in which the jurists lived and developed their 
views. And because it was a societal and collective enterprise, 
it was open to a multiplicity of views and to a degree of toler-
ance for di≠erence. For al-Sayyid, the great danger today lies 
in giving the state, with narrow-minded Islamists at its helm, 
the exclusive right to determine the content and contours of 
Islamic law. He presents the case of Iran under the Islamic 
Republic as an example of this phenomenon. The Ayatollahs’ 
regime, according to al-Sayyid, has tarnished the religion’s 
reputation and alienated people from the law by imposing 
it from above. Al-Sayyid’s fear is that the same will happen 
now in the Sunni Arab world, and people will turn away 
from Islam altogether.7 
7 For an exposition of these views, see, e.g., Ridwan al-Sayyid, 
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factors. In the specific case of the Reformers and Islamists, it 
is their particular vision of the role of the state and what the 
Shari‘a can accomplish that represents a radical break with the 
past—one that leaves Muslims without historical landmarks 
and inevitably leads to the interpretive chaos that Kawthari 
foresaw. The wanton violence of the Salafi-Jihadis who are 
directly inspired by the Reformists, for example, can be seen 
as a direct consequence of this break with the past. It can be 
a terrible thing to throw the baby out with the bathwater.
This publication is set in the Yale typeface by the Office of the 
Yale University Printer, and printed by ghp in West Haven, 
Connecticut.
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